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Abstract
We contrast Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), the theoretical basis for the devel-
opment of financial instruments, with a dynamical picture of an interacting market, in
a simple setting. The proliferation of financial instruments apparently provides more
means for risk diversification, making the market more efficient and complete. In the
simple market of interacting traders discussed here, the proliferation of financial instru-
ments erodes systemic stability and it drives the market to a critical state characterized
by large susceptibility, strong fluctuations and enhanced correlations among risks. This
suggests that the hypothesis of APT may not be compatible with a stable market dy-
namics. In this perspective, market stability acquires the properties of a common good,
which suggests that appropriate measures should be introduced in derivative markets,
to preserve stability.
”In my view, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers
that, while now latent, are potentially lethal”. At the time of Warren Buffet warning [1]
markets were remarkably stable and the creativity of financial engineers was pushing the
frontiers of Arbitrage Pricing Theory to levels of unprecedented sophistication. It took 5
years and a threefold increase in size of credit derivative markets [2], for Warren Buffet
”time bomb” to explode [1].
Paradoxically, this crisis occurred in a sector which has been absorbing human capital
with strong scientific and mathematical skills, as no other industry. Apparently, this po-
tential was mostly used to increase the degree of sophistication of mathematical models,
leaving our understanding lagging behind the increasing complexity of financial markets.
Recent events raise many questions:
• The sub-prime mortgage market was approximately 5% of the US real estate market,
and the risk was well diversified across the whole world. Why did such a small
perturbation cause so large an effect?
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• Why are stock prices affected by a crisis in derivative markets?
• Why did correlations between risks grow so large during the recent crisis [3], with
respect to their bona-fide estimates before the crisis?
These and other questions find no answer in the theories of mathematical economics
[9]. Indeed, real markets look quite different with respect to the picture which Arbitrage
Pricing Theory (APT) [16] gives of them. The problem is that APT is not merely a
theoretical description of a phenomenon, as other theories in Natural Sciences. It is the
theory on which financial engineering is based. It enters into the functioning of the system
it is describing, i.e. it is part of the problem itself.
The key function of financial markets is that of allowing inter-temporal exchanges of
wealth, in a state contingent manner. Taking this view, APT makes it possible to give a
present monetary value to future risks, and hence to price complex derivative contracts1.
In order to do this, APT relies on concepts, such as perfect competition, market liquidity,
no-arbitrage and market completeness, which allows one to neglect completely the feedback
of trading on market’s dynamics. These concepts are very powerful, and indeed APT has
been very successful in stable market conditions. In addition, the proliferation of financial
instruments provides even further instrument for hedging and pricing other derivatives. So
the proliferation of financial instruments produces precisely that arbitrage-free, complete
market which is hypothesized by APT2.
In theory. In practice, markets are never perfectly liquid. The very fact that information
can be aggregated into prices, requires that prices respond to trading (see e.g. [6] for
evidence on FX markets or [5] for equity markets). In other words, it is because markets
are illiquid that they can aggregate information into prices. Liquidity indeed is a matter of
time scale and volume size [4, 5]. This calls for a view of financial markets as interacting
systems. In this view, trading strategies can affect the market in important ways3. Both
theoretical models and empirical research, show that trading activity implied by derivatives
affects the underlying market in non-trivial ways [10]. Furthermore, the proliferation of
financial instruments (Arrow’s securities), in a model with heterogeneous agents, was found
to lead to market instability [7].
The aim of this paper is to contrast, within a simple framework, the picture of APT
with a dynamical picture of a market as an interacting system. We show that while the
introduction of derivatives makes the market more efficient, competition between financial
1Part of Buffet’s concerns, was related to the fact that the same mechanisms can be reversed, in a free
market, to transfer and accumulate risks into the future for present return. Our focus, as we shall see, is
more general and has to do with the inadequacy of the assumptions on which pricing theories are based.
2In this view, as detailed for example in Ref. [11], market failures (e.g. crashes) are seen as arising
from failures in regulatory institutions. The focus is then on the design of institutional structures which
can guarantee that markets operate close to the ideal conditions. Such view has been also advocated in the
context of the 2007-2008 crisis [12].
3For example, Ref. [8] argues that even as innocent trading practices as portfolio optimization strategies,
can cause dynamic instabilities if their impact on the underlying market is large enough.
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institutions naturally drives the market to a critical state characterized by a sharp singu-
larity. Close to the singularity the market exhibits the three properties alluded to above:
1) a strong susceptibility to small perturbations and 2) strong fluctuations in the underly-
ing stock market. Furthermore 3) while correlations across different derivatives is largely
negligible in normal times, correlations in the derivative market are strongly enhanced in
stress times, when the market is close to the critical state. In brief, this suggests that the
hypothesis of APT may not be compatible with the requirement of a stable market.
Capturing the increasing complexity of financial markets in a simple mathematical
framework is a daunting task. We draw inspiration from the physics of disordered sys-
tems, in physics, such as inhomogeneous alloys which are seen as systems with random
interactions. Likewise, we characterize the typical properties of an ensemble of markets
with derivatives being drawn from a given distribution. Our model is admittedly stylized
and misses several important features, such as the risks associated with increased market
exposure in stress conditions or the increase in demand of financial instruments in order to
replicate other financial instruments. However, it provides a coherent picture of collective
market phenomena.
But it is precisely because these models are simple that one is able to point out why
theoretical concepts such as efficient or complete markets and competitive equilibria have
non-trivial implications. The reason being that these conditions hold only in special points
of the phase diagram where singularity occurs (phase transitions). It is precisely when
markets approach these ideal conditions that instabilities and strong fluctuations appear
[13, 14]. Loosely speaking, this arises from the fact that the market equilibrium becomes
degenerate along some directions in the phase space4. In a complete, arbitrage-free mar-
ket, the introduction of a derivative contract creates a symmetry, as it introduces perfectly
equivalent ways of realizing the same payoffs. Fluctuations along the direction of phase
space identified by symmetries can grow unbounded. Loosely speaking, the financial in-
dustry is a factory of symmetries, which is why the proliferation of financial instruments
can cause strong fluctuations and instabilities. In this respect, the study of competitive
equilibria alone can be misleading. What is mostly important is their stability with respect
to adaptive behavior of agents and the dynamical fluctuations they support and generate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section recalls the basics of
APT in a simple case, setting the stage for the following sections. Then we introduce the
model and discuss its behavior. We illustrate the generic behavior of the model in a simple
case where the relevant parameters are the number of different derivatives and the risk
premium. In this setting we first examine the properties of competitive equilibria and then
discuss the fluctuations induced within a simple adaptive process, by which banks learn to
converge to these equilibria. Then we illustrate a more general model with a distribution of
risk premia. This confirms the general conclusion that, as markets expand in complexity,
4The phase space is the state of the dynamical variables. The relation between fluctuations and degen-
eracy of equilibria has also been verified in other models, such as the Lux-Marchesi model [15].
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they approach a phase transition point, as discussed above.
The final section concludes with some perspectives and suggests some measures to
prevent market instability.
1 The world of asset pricing
A caricature of markets, from the point of view of financial engineering, is the following
single period asset pricing framework [16]: There are only two times t = 0 (today) and 1
(tomorrow). The world at t = 1 can be in any of Ω states and let piω be the probability
that state ω = 1, . . . ,Ω occurs.
There are K risky assets whose price is one at t = 0 and is 1+rωk at t = 1, k = 1, . . . ,K
if state ω materializes. There is also a risk-less asset (bond) which also costs one today
and pays one tomorrow, in all states5. Prices of assets are assumed given at the outset.
Portfolios of assets can be built in order to transfer wealth from one state to the other.
A portfolio ~θ is a linear combination with weights θk, k = 0, . . . ,K on the riskless and risky
assets. The value of the portfolio at t = 0 is
Vθ(t = 0) =
K∑
k=0
θk,
which is the price the investor has to pay to buy ~θ at t = 0. The return of the portfolio,
i.e. the difference between its value at t = 1 and at t = 0, is given by
rωθ ≡
K∑
k=1
θkr
ω
k .
The construction of Arbitrage Pricing Theory relies on the following steps
No-arbitrage It is assumed that returns rωk are such that there is no portfolio ~θ whose
return rωθ ≥ 0 is non-negative for all ω and strictly positive on at least one state ω.
Equivalent martingale measure The absence of arbitrages implies the existence of an
Equivalent Martingale Measure (EMM) qω which satisfies
Eq[rk] ≡
∑
ω
qωrωk = 0, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K.
Valuation of contingent claims For a contingent claim f we mean a contract between
a buyer and a seller where the seller commits to pay an amount fω to the buyer
dependent on the state ω. If the seller can build a portfolio θ of securities such that
5This is equivalent to considering, for the sake of simplicity, discounted prices right from the beginning.
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fω = f0 + rωθ , i.e. which ”replicates” f , then the seller can buy the portfolio and
ensure that she can meet her commitment. Then the value of the replicating portfolio
provides a price for the contract f , and it is easy to see that this can be expressed in
the form
Vf = Eq[f ] =
∑
ω
qωfω
Claims f for which this construction is possible are called marketable. If this is
not possible, the parties may differ in their valuation of f because of their different
perception of risk. Put differently, there may be many different EMM’s consistent
with the absence of arbitrage, each giving a different valuation of the contract f .
Complete markets If there are at least Ω independent vectors among the vectors (r1k, . . . , r
Ω
k ),
k = 1, . . . ,K and (1, . . . , 1), then any possible claim is marketable, which means that
it can be priced. In such a case the market is called complete and the risk neutral
measure is unique.
Summarizing, the logic of financial engineering is: assuming that markets are arbitrage
free, the price of any contingent claim, no matter how exotic, can be computed. This
involves some consideration of risk, as long as markets are incomplete. But if one can
assumes that markets are complete, then prices can be computed in a manner which is
completely independent of risk. Note indeed that the probability distribution over ω plays
no role at all in the above construction. It is also worth to remark that asset return rωk do
not depend, by construction, on the type of portfolios which are traded in the market.
A complete, arbitrage free market is the best of all possible worlds. When markets
expand in both complexity and volumes, one is tempted to argue that this is indeed a good
approximation of real financial markets.
2 A picture of the market as an interacting system
Why are markets arbitrage free? Because, according to the standard folklore, otherwise
”everybody would ’jump in’ [...] affecting the prices of the security” [16].
Now let us assume that prices are affected not only when ”everybody jumps in” but
anytime someone trades, even though the effect is very small, for individual trades. In
the simplified picture of the market we shall discuss below, prices depend on the balance
between demand and supply; If demand is higher than supply return is positive, otherwise
it is negative. Demand comes from either an exogenous state contingent process or is
generated from the derivative market in order to match contracts.
Here derivatives are simply contracts which deliver a particular amount of asset in a
given state (e.g. an umbrella if it rains, nothing otherwise). Even if markets are severely
incomplete, financial institutions – which we shall call banks for short in what follows – will
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match the demand for a particular derivative contract if that turns out to be profitable,
i.e. if the revenue they extract from it exceeds a risk premium.
Competition in the financial industry brings on one side to smaller risk premia and on
the other to a wider diversity of financial instruments being marketed in the stock market.
These two effects are clearly related because the increase in financial complexity – measured
by the number of different financial instruments – makes the market less incomplete and
hence it reduces the spread in the prices of derivatives. When financial complexity is large
enough the market becomes complete because each claim can be replicated by a portfolio
of bond and derivatives. Beyond this point, there is an unique value for the price of each
derivative, which is the one computed from APT.
Though the story is different, the conclusion seems to be the same: Efficient, arbitrage-
free, complete markets. The holy grail of financial engineering.
Actually, the road to efficient, arbitrage-free, complete markets can be plagued by
singularities which arise upon increasing financial complexity. We shall illustrate this point
within the stylized one period framework discussed above.
2.1 A stylized model
Take the one period framework as above, and let piω be the probability that state ω =
1, . . . ,Ω materializes.
Imagine there is a single risky asset6 and a risk-less asset. Again we shall implicitly
take discounted processes, so we set the return of the risk-less security to zero. The price
of the risky asset is 1 at t = 0 and 1 + rω, in state ω. However, rather than defining at
the outset the return of the asset in each state, we assume it is fixed by the law of demand
and supply.
Banks develop and issue financial instruments. In this simplified world, a financial
instrument is a pair (c, aω) where c is the cost payed to the bank at t = 0 by the investor
and aω is the amount of risky asset it delivers in state ω at t = 1. We imagine there is a
demand s0 7 for each of N possible financial instruments (ci, aωi ), i = 1, . . . , N . The return
of the asset at t = 1 in each state ω is given by
rω = dω0 +
N∑
i=1
sia
ω
i (1)
where dω0 is assumed to arise from investors’ excess demand whereas the second term is
generated by banks hedging derivative contracts8.
6Generalization to more assets is straightforward.
7More precisely, we assume investors submit a demand function which is of s0 units of derivative i if the
price is less than ci and zero otherwise.
8There are several ways to motivate Eq. (1). The most transparent one, for our purposes, is that of
assuming a finite liquidity of the underlying asset in a market maker setting such as that of Ref. [19].
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The supply si of instrument i is fixed by banks in order to maximize expected profit.
The expected profit for a unit supply (si = 1) is given by:
ui = ci −
Ω∑
ω=1
piωaωi (1 + r
ω). (2)
Notice that, even though rω depends on the supply si of derivative i, by Eq. (1), banks
in a competitive market neglect this dependence and take prices (i.e. returns) as given.
Rather, banks will sell derivatives if the expected profit is large enough, and will not
sell it otherwise. Specifically, we assume that banks match the demand of investors (i.e.
si = s0) if ui > u¯i, whereas si = 0 if ui < u¯i. When ui = u¯i then the supply can take
any value si ∈ [0, s0]. Here u¯i can be interpreted as a risk premium related to the risk
aversion of banks. Indeed, as long as the market is incomplete, there is not an unique price
for derivatives. Even if the prices ci were fixed on the basis of an equivalent martingale
measure qω, as in Section 3.1, it is not possible, for banks, to eliminate risk altogether9.
2.2 A typical large complex market
Financial markets are quite complex, with all sorts of complicated financial instruments.
This situation is reproduced in our framework by assuming that demand dω0 and derivatives
aωi are drawn independently at random. Furthermore we take the limit Ω→∞. This sit-
uation clearly defies analytical approaches for a specific realization. Remarkably, however,
it is possible to characterize the statistical behavior of typical realizations of such large
complex markets.
In order to do that, some comments on the scaling of different quantities, with the
number of states Ω, is in order. The interesting region is the one where the number of
derivatives N is of the same order of the number of states Ω (N ∼ Ω). In this regime we
expect the market to approach completeness. For this reason we introduce the variable
n = N/Ω. Assuming that rω be a finite random variable in the limit Ω, N → ∞, requires
dω0 to be a finite random variable – e.g. normal with mean d¯ and variance ∆. Likewise, we
Between the time (t = 0) when derivatives are signed and the maturity (t = 1), banks have to accumulate
a position aωi in the underlying for each contract i they have sold (si = 1). At the same time, an exogenous
excess demand dω0 is generated by e.g. fundamental trading or other unspecified investment. The coefficient
between returns and excess demand – e.g. the market depth – is assumed to be one here, for simplicity of
notation. Market clearing between demand and supply can also be invoked to motivate Eq. (1). Though
that conforms more closely with the paradigms of mathematical economics, it introduces unnecessary
conceptual complication within the stylized picture of the market given here. Likewise, we impose absence
of arbitrages in the market by assuming that there exist an equivalent martingale measure qω > 0 such that
Eq[r] = 0. For the results presented below, this is an irrelevant assumption, so we shall not insist more on
this.
9We do not consider here the possibility for banks to buy a portfolio of derivatives from other banks in
order to hedge the derivative contracts they sell. This aspect has been addressed in a simpler setting in
Ref. [17].
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shall take aωi as random variables with zero average and variance 1/Ω. Indeed, the second
term of Eq. (1) with aωi ∼ 1/
√
Ω is of the order of
√
N/Ω, which is finite in the limit we
are considering10.
It is convenient, in the following discussion, to introduce the parameter
i
Ω
≡ u¯i −
[
ci − c(0)i
]
. (3)
where c(0)i =
∑
ω pi
ωaωi is the expected price of instrument i, at t = 0. The dependence on
Ω in the equation above is motivated by the fact that the variance of c(0)i and of the second
term in Eq. (2), is of order piω2 ∼ 1/Ω2. This implies that the relevant scale for the r.h.s.
of Eq. (3) is of order 1/Ω. The parameter i encodes the risk premium which banks for
selling derivative i.
In the next section, we take the simplifying assumption that i =  does not depend
on i, in order to illustrate the generic behavior of the model. In the next section, we shall
discuss the case where i depends on i. Actually, i encodes the risk premium that banks
require for trading derivatives and hence should depend on the volatility of the realized
returns rω and on the degree of market completeness. While keeping this in mind, we
will consider i as an independent parameter with the idea that it decreases from positive
values when the volatility of the market decreases or on the route to market completeness.
We shall return to this point below.
2.3 Competitive market equilibrium
We consider, in this section, the situation where banks chose the supply si so as to maximize
their profit, considering returns rω as given. The statistical properties corresponding to
this state – the so-called competitive equilibrium – can be related to those of the minima
of a global function H, by the following statement:
The competitive market equilibrium is given by the solution of the minimization of the
function
H =
1
2
Ω∑
ω=1
piω (rω)2 +

Ω
N∑
i=1
si (4)
over the variables 0 ≤ si ≤ s0, where rω is given in terms of si by Eq. (1).
Notice that, if  is negligible, this results states that a consequence of banks maximizing
their utility, is that return’s volatility – the first term of Eq.(4) – is reduced. Actually,
with  > 0, only those derivatives which decrease volatility are traded (si > 0). This is an
”unintended consequence” of banks’ profit seeking behavior, i.e. a feature which emerges
without agents aiming at it.
10Equivalently, one could assume aωi to be of order one, but introduce a coefficient λ = 1/
√
Ω in Eq. (1)
as a finite market depth.
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A proof of the statement above follows by direct inspection of the first order conditions
and the observation that ∂H∂si = −(ui− u¯i). We first observe that H as a function of any of
the si is a convex function,
∂2H
∂s2i
=
Ω∑
ω=1
piω (aωi )
2 ≥ 0
hence it has a single minimum, for 0 ≤ si ≤ s0. Imagine {s∗i } to be the minimum of H. If
s∗i = 0 it must be that
∂H
∂si
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= u¯i − ui > 0.
If ui < u¯i, it is not convenient for banks to sell derivative i, which is consistent with zero
supply (s∗i = 0). Likewise, if s
∗
i = s0 the first order condition yields ui > u¯i, which is
the condition under which banks should sell as many derivatives as possible. If instead
0 < s∗i < s0, then ui = u¯i which is consistent with perfect competition among banks
11.
From a purely mathematical point of view, we notice that H is a quadratic form which
depends on N variables {si}, through the Ω linear combinations given by the returns rω.
It is intuitively clear that, as N increases, the minimum of H becomes more and more
shallow and, for large N , it is likely that there will be directions in the space of {si} (i.e.
linear combinations of the si) along which H is almost flat. Such quasi-degeneracy of
the equilibria corresponds to the emergence of symmetries discussed in the introduction.
The location of the equilibrium is likely to be very sensitive to perturbation along these
directions. These qualitative conclusions can be put on firmer grounds by the theoretical
approach which we discuss next.
A full characterization of the solution of the minimization of H, in the limit Ω, N →∞
with N/Ω = n fixed, can be derived with tools of statistical mechanics of disordered sys-
tems (see appendix), following similar lines of those in Ref. [13]. Indeed, mathematically
the model is quite similar to the Grand Canonical Minority Game studied in Ref. [14]. The
solution can be summarized in the following ”representative” derivative problem: Given a
normal random variable z with mean zero and unit variance, the supply of the ”represen-
tative” derivative is given by
sz = max
{
s0,min
{
0,
√
g + ∆z − (1 + χ)
}}
(5)
where
g = nEz[s2z] (6)
χ =
nEz[szz]√
g + ∆− nEz[szz]
(7)
11This result can be generalized in a straightforward way to any monotonous investors’ demand function
for derivatives. This goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Figure 1: Volatility Σ = Epi
[
(r − Epi[r])2
]
in competitive equilibria (full lines), as a function
of n = N/Ω, for different values of . Points refer to the variance of r¯ω computed in
numerical simulations of a system with Ω = 64 (s0 = 1).
are determined self-consistently in terms of expected values Ez[. . .] over functions of the
variable z. Loosely speaking, z embodies the interaction through the market of the ”repre-
sentative” derivative with all other derivatives. Any quantity, such as the average supply
of derivatives
s¯ ≡ lim
Ω→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
s∗i = Ez[sz] (8)
can be computed from the solution.
Figure 1 plots the volatility Σ = Epi
[
(r − Epi[r])2
]
as a function of n for small values
of . As it can be seen, as the market grows in financial complexity, fluctuations in returns
of the risky asset decrease and, beyond a value n∗ ' 4.14542 . . ., they become very small
(of order 2, for small ). The expected return Epi[r] = d¯/(1 + χ) also decreases, keeping a
bounded Sharpe ratio Epi[r]/
√
Σ = d¯/
√
g + ∆.
This situation in the region n > n∗ and   1 resembles closely the picture of an
efficient, arbitrage free complete market. Unfortunately this is also the locus of a sharp
discontinuity, as shown in Fig. 2. This plots s¯ as a function of n for different values of
. As it can be seen, as the market grows in financial complexity, it passes from a regime
(n < n∗) where its behavior is continuous and smooth with  to one (n > n∗) which features
a sharp discontinuity at  = 012.
12It should be noted that N is not the actual value of derivatives traded, but the number of derivatives for
which there is a demand. The number of derivatives with si > 0, is well approximated by NProb{sz > 0},
which is less than Ω, for  > 0.
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In particular, the discontinuity manifests clearly in the limit s0 →∞ when the demand
of investors is unbounded. Then while for  > 0 the average supply s¯ is finite, for  < 0
and n > 2 the supply s¯ → ∞ diverges as s0 → ∞. In other words, while in one region
( > 0 and  < 0 for n < 2) the equilibrium is controlled by the supply side, in the other
region ( < 0, n > 2) the equilibrium is dominated by the demand
side. This distinction, as we shall see in the next section, applies to a more general model
where i depends on i.
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Figure 2: Average supply s¯ in competitive equilibria (full lines) for different values of .
Points refer to the variance of r¯ω computed in numerical simulations of a system with
Ω = 64 (s0 = 1).
The consequences of the singularity at n > n∗ and  = 0 are not entirely evident in
the competitive equilibrium setting. Indeed they manifest strongly in response functions:
The market behavior close to the singularity is quite sensitive to small perturbations. For
example a small change in the risk perception of banks (i.e. in ) can provoke a dramatic
change in the volume of trading in the derivative market.
The effects of this increased susceptibility appears dramatically in the case where the
interaction is repeated over time and banks learn and adapt to investors’ demand. This
setting not only allows us to understand under what conditions will banks learn to con-
verge to the competitive equilibrium, but it also sheds light on the emergent fluctuation
phenomena.
11
2.4 Adaptive behavior of banks
Let us assume that the context outlined above is repeated for many periods (e.g. days),
indexed by t = 1, . . .. Let ω(t) be the state of the market at time t and assume this is drawn
independently from the distribution piω in each period. Accordingly, the returns rω(t) are
still determined by Eq. (1), with ω = ω(t) and si = si(t), the supply of instruments of
type i in period t.
In order to determine the latter, banks estimate the profitability of instrument i on
historical data. They assign a score (or attraction) Ui(t) to each instrument i, which they
update in the following manner:
Ui(t+ 1) = Ui(t) + ui(t)− u¯i = Ui(t)− aω(t)i rω(t) −

Ω
. (9)
Notice that, by Eq. (2) and (3), Ui(t) increases (decreases) if ui > u¯i (ui < u¯i). Banks
supply instrument i according to the simple rule
si(t) =
{
0 if Ui(t) ≤ 0
s0 if Ui(t) > 0
(10)
Therefore, if instrument i provides an expected utility larger than the margin u¯i, its score
will increase and the bank will sell it more likely. Conversely, an instrument with ui(t) < u¯i,
on average, has a decreasing score and it will not be offered by banks.
It can be checked that, in the stationary state, the average probability si = Prob{si(t) =
1} that banks issue derivative i is again given by the configuration {si} which minimizes
H in Eq. (4). Indeed, Figs. (1,2) show that averages in the stationary state of the process
nicely follow the theoretical results derived above.
At odds with the competitive equilibrium setting, in the present case the volatility of
returns also acquires a contribution from the fluctuations of the variables si(t), which is
induced by the random choice of the state ω(t). Hence, we can distinguish two sources of
fluctuations in returns
r(t) = r¯ω(t) + δr(t) (11)
the first depending on the stochastic realization of the state ω(t), the second from fluc-
tuations in the learning dynamics. Here r¯ω is the average return of the asset in state ω,
and it can be shown that it converges to its competitive equilibrium value, ∀ω. Indeed
the contribution of r¯ω to the volatility Σ = Epi
[
(r¯ − Epi[r¯])2
]
closely follows the theoretical
curve in Fig. (1).
The dynamical contribution to the volatility V = Epi[δr2] instead shows a singular
behavior which reflects the discontinuity of s¯ across the line  = 0 for n > n∗. Our
theoretical approach also allows us to estimate this contribution to the fluctuations under
the assumption that the variables si(t) are statistically independent. As Fig. 3 shows, this
theory reproduces remarkably well the results of numerical simulations for n < n∗ but it
fails dramatically for n > n∗ in the region close to  = 0. The same effect arises in Minority
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Figure 3: Dynamical contribution to the volatility V = Epi[δr2] in numerical simulations
of a system with Ω = 64 for different values of  (points). Lines refer to the theoretical
prediction in the approximation of independent variables si(t). Inset: Total volatility σ2r¯+V
in numerical simulations for n = 1 (+ for Ω = 128 and × for 256) and n = 10 (∗ for Ω = 32
and • for Ω = 64) as a function of .
Games [13, 24], where its origin has been traced back to the assumption of independence
of the variables si(t). This suggests that in this region, the supplies of different derivatives
are strongly correlated. This effect has a purely dynamical origin and it is reminiscent of
the emergence of persistent correlations arising from trading in the single asset model of
Ref. [18].
We have considered  as a fixed parameter up to now. Actually, in a more refined model,
i should depend on i and it should be fixed endogenously in terms of the incentives of
investors and banks. At the level of the discussion given thus far, it is sufficient to say that
the scale of incentives of banks and investors, and hence of , is fixed by the average return
r¯ = d¯/(1 + χ) or by the volatility
√
Σ + V . Both these quantities decrease as n increases,
so it is reasonable to conclude that  should be a decreasing function of n, in any model
where it is fixed endogenously. In other words, as the financial complexity (n) increases,
the market should follow a trajectory in the parameter space (n, ), which approaches the
critical line n > n∗,  = 0.
In the next section, we address this problem in an approximate manner, extending our
analysis to the case where i depends on i.
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3 Asset dependent risk premia
The model considered above can be improved in many ways. For example, the price of
derivatives can be determined according to APT, thus making the market arbitrage free
both in the underlying and in derivatives. In this section we will explore this direction in
the simplest possible case where the equivalent martingale measure is given. In particular
we will show that this dynamical pricing mechanism is somehow equivalent to an asset
dependent risk premia framework. In order to get some insights, we will then generalize
the model considered in the previous sections to the case of a quenched distribution of
risk premia. This assumes that derivative prices change over much longer time-scales than
those of trading.
3.1 Dynamical pricing of derivatives
In the previous sections prices of derivatives were fixed by the exogenous parameter  and
no role was explicitly played by the risk neutral measure q. In this section we consider the
case where prices of derivatives are directly computed according to APT. The framework
is the same as before, but prices are computed through the risk neutral measure qω as
ci = Eq[aωi (1 + r
ω)] =
∑
ω
qωaωi (1 + r
ω) (12)
instead of being fixed by the external parameter . As before, the EMM q is fixed exoge-
nously. Again the return of the risky asset is assumed to depend both on an exogenous
demand and on the demand induced by the trading of derivatives
rω = dω0 +
N∑
i=1
sia
ω
i . (13)
The supply of derivatives si ∈ [0, s0] is then fixed by banks in order to maximize the utility
function
ui = ci − Epi[aωi (1 + rω)] =
∑
ω
(qω − piω)aωi (1 + rω). (14)
As in Eq. (2), the first term is the price of the derivative they cash from clients and the
second is the expected cost of buying the stock. Again, banks will sell derivative i only if
ui > u¯, where u¯ is a risk premium. The analog of Eq. (3) then becomes
i
Ω
= u¯−
∑
ω
(qω − piω)aωi −
∑
ω
qωaωi r
ω. (15)
The appearance of asset-dependent i calls for an in-depth comparison with the simplified
version studied in the previous sections.
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Figure 5: Volatility for a system with Ω = 64.
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We performed numerical simulations using the same learning scheme as before (Eq. 9),
in order to detect typical features of the distribution of {i}. We observe that the width of
the distribution increases with n. A plot of the variance σ2 of the distribution as a function
of n is shown in figure 4. Notice that, for n large enough, σ2 ∼ n2. Figure (5) shows the
volatility Σ as a function of n. As we can see, also the volatility increases as the square of
the market complexity Σ ∼ n2, so that Σ ∼ σ2 . As APT naturally leads to the appearence
of a distribution of asset risk premia, it is instructive to generalize the above picture to
the case of quenched asset dependent risk premia, where a full analytical solution can be
obtained.
3.2 Quenched asset dependent risk premia
In this section, we consider the case where
the {i}are taken as quenched asset-dependent random variables drawn from a gaussian
distribution with mean  and variance σ2 . In analogy with the previous treatment, the
competitive equilibrium is equivalent to finding the ground state of the Hamiltonian
H =
1
2
∑
ω
piω(rω)2 +
∑
i
i
Ω
si. (16)
As before, the solution can be summarized in a representative derivative problem.
Given a normal random variable z with 0 mean and unit variance, the supply of the
representative derivative is given by
sz = min
s0,max
0,
√
g+∆
(1+χ)2
+ σ2 z − 
ν

 , (17)
where
g = nEz[s2z ], (18)
χ =
nEz[szz](1 + χ)√
g + ∆ + σ2 (1 + χ)2
(19)
are determined self-consistently.
The main features of this generalized problem are as follows:
1. As for the homogeneous case, the fluctuations of returns eventually become very small
as the market complexity n increases (see figure (6) where we plot the volatility of
returns Σ = Epi[r−Epi[r]2]). However, we can observe that the value n∗ beyond which
the volatility approaches zero depends on the width of the risk premium distribution,
and it increases with σ2 .
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2. The sharp transition previously observed in the behavior of the average supply for
large n becomes smooth as soon as the risk premium distribution has a finite width
(see Figure (7)).
The sharpness of the crossover in the behavior of s as a function of ¯ is enhanced as
the demand s0 for derivatives increases. This signals a transition from a supply limited
equilibrium, where the main determinant of the supply si of derivatives is banks’ profits, to
a demand limited equilibrium, where si is mostly limited by the finiteness of the investors’
demand. In order to make this point explicit, it is instructive to investigate the case of
unbounded supply (s0 → ∞), because the transition becomes sharp in this limit. The
representative derivative, in this case, is described by
sz = max
0,
√
g+∆
(1+χ)2
+ σz − 
ν
 , (20)
and, as before,
g = nEz[s2z ], (21)
χ =
nEz[szz](1 + χ)√
g + ∆ + σ2 (1 + χ)2
. (22)
In contrast with the bounded case and similarly to the case σ = 0, the system displays
a phase separation in the (, n) plane between a region in which the average supply remains
finite and a region in which the volume of the traded assets diverges (see left panel of Figure
8).
Introducing a distribution of risk premia with variance σ has then very different effects
depending on whether the supply is bounded or not. In the first case σ acts as a regularizer
preventing the occurrence of a sharp phase transition. In the second case, namely s0 →∞,
σ 6= 0 entails a deformation of the critical line that tends to flatten along the n = 2 line as
σ grows (see right panel of Figure 8 ). This characterization allows to get some insights
on the case in which prices are dynamically generated.
As we showed before, in such a situation the system is characterized by a distribution of
effective risk premia which becomes broader as market increases in complexity. Hence,
upon increasing n, one expects a transition from a situation where volumes are limited by
the profitability of derivative trading, to one where the demand is saturated.
4 Conclusions
We presented here a very stylized description of an arbitrage free market, showing that also
whithin the ideal context of APT the uncontrolled proliferation of financial intruments can
lead to large fluctuations and instability in the market. Interestingly, within our simplified
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model, the proliferation of financial instruments drives the market through a transition to
a state where volumes of trading rapidly expand and saturate investors’ demand.
In order for these kind of models to be more realistic, some improvements certainly are
needed. For instance, the demand for derivatives can be derived from a state dependent
utility function for consumption at t = 1. This could also be a way to obtain an endogenous
risk neutral measure, one of the main problems in the picture of dynamical prices considered
above being that the risk neutral measure was fixed exogenously. We believe that, while
accounting for these effects can make the model more appealing, the collective behavior
of the model will not significantly change. Indeed, the qualitative behavior discussed
above is typical of a broad class of models [13] and mainly depends on the proliferation of
degeneracies in the equilibria of the model.
The focus of the present paper is on theoretical concepts. Their relevance for real
markets requires quantitative estimates of the parameters. Given the abstract nature of
the model, this appears to be a non-trivial task which is an interesting avenue of future
research.
It has been recently suggested that market stability appears to have the properties of
a public good [22]. A public good is a good i) whose consumption by one individual does
not reduce its availability for consumption by others (non-rivalry) and ii) such that no
one can be effectively excluded from using the good (non-excludability). At the level of
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the present stylized description, the expansion in the repertoire of traded assets introduces
an externality which drives the market to unstable states. This suggests that systemic
instability may be prevented by the introduction of a tax on derivative markets, such as that
advocated long ago for foreign exchange markets by Tobin [23], or by the introduction of
”trading permits”, similar to those adopted to limit Carbon emissions [25]. The stabilizing
effect of a Tobin tax has already been shown within a model of a dynamic market which
is mathematically equivalent to the one presented here [24].
In summary, this paper suggests that the ideal view of the markets on which financial
engineering is based is not compatible with market stability. The proliferation of financial
instruments makes the market look more and more similar to an ideal arbitrage-free, ef-
ficient and complete market. But this occurs at the expense of market stability. This is
reminiscent of the instability discussed long ago by Sir Robert May [20] which develops
in ecosystems upon increasing bio-diversity13. For ecologies this result is only apparently
paradoxical. Indeed the species which populate an ecosystem can hardly be thought of as
being drawn at random, but are rather subject to natural selection. Indeed, on evolution-
ary time scales stability can be reconciled with bio-diversity, as shown e.g. in Ref. [21].
The diversity in the ecosystem of financial instruments has, by contrast, been increasing
at a rate much faster than that at which selective forces likely operate.
In contrast with the axiomatic equilibrium picture of APT, on which financial engi-
neering is based, the model discussed here provides a coherent, though stylized, picture
of a financial market as a system with interacting units. In this picture, concepts such
as no-arbitrage, perfect competition, market efficiency or completeness arise as emergent
properties of the aggregate behavior, rather than being postulated from the outset. We
believe that such an approach can potentially shed light on the causes of and conditions
under which liquidity crises, arbitrages and market crashes occur.
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A Calculation
The problem is then the one of finding the ground state of the Hamiltonian
H =
1
2
∑
ω
piω(rω)2 +
∑
i
i
Ω
si =
1
2
ω∑
ω=1
rω2 +
N∑
i=1
g(si), (23)
13This similarity can be made even more precise, within the model ecosystems discussed in [13].
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is carried out in the usual manner. Let’s write down the partition function
Zq,a = Trr,se−βHδ
(∑
ω
qωrω
)
Ω∏
ω=1
δ
(
rω − dω −
∑
i
sia
ω
i
)
(24)
=
∫
du
2pi
Trr,se−β
P
i g(si)
Ω∏
ω=1
eiur
ωqω−β
2
rω2δ
(
rω − dω −
∑
i
sia
ω
i
)
(25)
=
∫
du
2pi
Trr,s,ξe−β
P
i g(si)
Ω∏
ω=1
eiur
ωqω−β
2
rω2+irωξω−idωξω−iξωPi siaωi (26)
where we have used the shorthand Tr to indicate integrals on the variables in the index.
Here it is understood that all variables si are integrated from 0 to 1 and all variables rω
and ξω are integrated over all the real axis, with a factor 1/(2pi) for each ω. The next step
is to replicate this, i.e. to write
Zmq,a =
∫
d~u
2pi
Tr
~r,~s,~ξ
e−β
P
i,a g(si,a)
Ω∏
ω=1
ei
P
a[uar
ω
a q
ω−β
2
rω2a+ir
ω
a ξ
ω
a−idωξωa ]−i
P
i a
ω
i
P
a si,aξ
ω
a
=
∫
d~u
2pi
Tr
~s,~ξ
e−β
P
i,a g(si,a)
Ω∏
ω=1
e
− 1
2β
P
a(uaq
ω+ξωa )
2−idωPa ξωa−iPi aωi Pa si,aξωa
where the sums on a runs over the m replicas. In the second equation above, we have
performed the integrals over rωa . We can now perform the average over the random variables
aωi which will be assumed to be normal with zero average and variance 1/Ω. This yields
〈Zmq 〉 =
∫
dG
∫
d~u
2pi
Tr~ξ
Ω∏
ω=1
e
− 1
2β
P
a(uaq
ω+ξωa )
2−idωPa ξωa− 12 Pa,b ξωa ξωb Ga,b〈Is(G)〉(27)
〈Is(G)〉 =
〈
Tr~se
−βPi,a g(si,a)∏
a≤b
δ
(
ΩGa,b −
∑
i
si,asi,b
)〉

, (28)
where the average 〈. . .〉 is taken over gaussian variables with mean  and variance σ2 and
the symbol dG stands for integration over all the independent entries of the matrix G. In
order to evaluate the latter we use a standard delta function identity bringing into play the
matrix R = Ra,b conjugated to the overlap matrix G = Ga,b. The -average is evaluated
as follows
〈Is(G)〉 =
∫
dRTr~se
P
a≤bRab[ΩGab−
P
i si,asi,b]
∫ +∞
−∞
∏
i
[
die
− (i−)
2
2σ2
−βPa g(si,a)]
=
∫
dRTr~se
P
a≤bRab[ΩGab−
P
i si,asi,b]−β
P
i,a s
a
i +
Ωβ2σ2
2
P
a,bGa,b ,
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where the quadratic term (
∑
a s
a
i )
2 arising from the gaussian integration has been replaced
by the overlap matrix. Taking the replica symmetric (RS) ansatz for G and R
Gab = g +
χ
β
δa,b, Rab = −β2r2 + β
2r2 + βν
2
δa,b (29)
the ~s-independent part of the exponent in the integrand takes the form
Ω
∑
a≤bRa,bGa,b +
Ωβ2σ2
2
∑
a,bGa,b
= Ωm
(
g + χβ
)(
βν
2 − β
2r2
2
)
− Ωm(m−1)2 gβ2r2 + Ωσ
2

2 (m
2β2g +mβχ)
' Ωmβ2
(
νg − r2χ+ σ2χ+ νχ/β
)
where we have neglected terms of order m2 in view of the m→ 0 limit. This yields
Is(G) =
∫
dRe
Ωmβ
2
[νg−r2χ+σ2χ+νχ/β]W[ν, r]N , (30)
where we have defined
W[ν, r] =
[
Tr~se−β
P
a[sa+ ν2 s2a]+ 12(βr
P
a sa)
2]N
. (31)
In the limit m→ 0 this quantity can be evaluated as follows
W[ν, r] = e
N log
»
Tr~se
−βPa[sa+ ν2 s2a]+ 12 (βrPa sa)2–
= exp
{
N log
[
Tr~se−β
P
a[sa+ ν2 s2a]
〈
ezβr
P
a sa
〉
z
]}
where we have performed a Hubbard-Stratonovich transformation in order to decouple the
{sa} variables introducing the average 〈. . .〉z over the gaussian variable z. Clearly:
W[ν, r] = exp
{
N log
〈(∫ 1
0
dse−β[s
2+s(−zr)]
)m 〉
z
}
. (32)
Exploiting the usual identity
log〈Xm〉 ' m〈logX〉, (33)
valid for m→ 0, we finally obtain
W[ν, r] = exp
{
Nm
〈
log
∫ 1
0
dse−β[s
2+s(−zr)]
〉
z
}
. (34)
Inserting (34) into (30) we eventually get
Is(G) =
∫
dRe
Ωmβ
n
1
2
[νg−r2χ+σ2χ+νχ/β]+n
β
D
log
R∞
0 dse
−β[s+νs2/2−rsz]
E
z
o
(35)
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After inserting (35) into (27) we have to perform the (m · Ω) integrals in ξωa . For each ω
J [χ, g, u] =
∫
d~ξe
− 1
2β
P
a(uaq
ω+ξa)
2−idωPa ξa− 12 Pa,b ξaξbGa,b (36)
The matrix G, in the RS ansatz has two distinct eigenvalues:
a‖ = mg +
χ
β multiplicity 1 (37)
a⊥ = χβ multiplicity m− 1. (38)
Therefore the determinant of
(
G+ Iβ
)
is clearly
det
(
G+
I
β
)
= e−
1
2
h
m log(χ+1)+log
“
1+βmg
1+χ
”i
. (39)
The expression (39) assists performing the gaussian integral in (36) as
J [χ, g, u] = e−
1
2
log
“
1+βm g
1+χ
”
−m
2
log(1+χ)+ βm
2(1+χ+mβg)
(uqω+idω)2−βm
2
(uqω)2 (40)
where we have rescaled u as u → βu and considered for ua the form ua = u ∀a. Taking
the average over qω in the limit m→ 0 we use the fact that
〈emf(q)〉q ' 1 +m〈f(q)〉q ' em〈f(q)〉q
which in our case yields
〈f(q)〉q = − βχ1 + χu
2 − 1
2
β〈d2〉
1 + χ
,
having taken for q an exponential distribution with average 1 . Hence
〈Zmq 〉 =
∫
dG
∫
dR
∫
d~u
2pi
emΩβF (41)
F = − u
2χ
1 + χ
− 1
2
g + 〈d2〉
1 + χ
− 1
2β
log(1 + χ) +
1
2
[
νg − r2χ+ σ2χ+
νχ
β
]
+
n
β
〈
log
∫ ∞
0
dse−β[s+νs
2/2−rsz]
〉
z
. (42)
We first observe that the saddle point equation for u yields u = 0. Then we take the limit
β →∞ which gives
F = −1
2
g + 〈d2〉
1 + χ
+
1
2
[
νg − r2χ+ σ2χ
]− n〈min
s≥0
[
s+
ν
2
s2 − rsz
]〉
z
(43)
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The saddle points equations, obtained differentiating (42) with respect to the order
parameters and sending β to ∞, read
r2 =
g + 〈d2〉
(1 + χ)2
+ σ2 (44)
ν =
1
1 + χ
(45)
g = n〈s2z〉z (46)
rχ = n〈szz〉z (47)
(48)
where sz = min{s0,max{0, (rz − )/ν}}, since, in our case, the supply is limited to 0 ≤
s ≤ s0. The above set of equations can then be recasted in the form
sz = min
{
1,max
{
0,
(
z
√
g+〈d2〉
(1+χ)2
+ σ2 − 
)
(1 + χ)
}}
(49)
g = nEz[s2z] (50)
χ = nEz [szz](1+χ)√
g+∆+σ2 (1+χ)
2
. (51)
The above calculation can also be performed, in order to probe the solution, introducing
an auxiliary field hω coupled to the returns rω. This allows also to easily compute the
average and the fluctuations of returns by deriving with respect to h the logarithm of the
free energy and then setting h = 0:
r¯ =
∑
ω
piωrω =
d¯
1 + χ
(52)
δr2 =
∑
ω
piω(rω − r¯)2 = g + 〈d
2〉 − 〈d〉2
(1 + χ)2
(53)
B Critical line
We show here how it is possible to find the critical line. Let us consider the case s ∈ [o,∞),
so that sz = max
{
0, rν (z − z0)
}
, with z0 = r . From the saddle pont equations we get
g =
n[〈d2〉+ σ2 (1 + χ)2]I2(z0)
1− nI2(z0) (54)
where we have defined I2(z0) =
∫∞
0 dz
e−z
2/2√
2pi
(z − z0)2. Inserting now this expression for g
into equation (44) and explointing r = /z0 we obtain
2
z20
(1− nI2(z0)) = σ2 +
〈d2〉
(1 + χ)2
(55)
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that using (47) can be writen as
2
z20
(1− nI2(z0)) = σ2 + 〈d2〉(1− nI1(z0))2, (56)
where I1 =
∫∞
0 dz
e−z
2/2√
2pi
(z − z0)z. If we now look for a solution in the case χ → ∞ the
above equation reduces to
2
σ2
(
1− I2(z0)
I1(z0)
)
= z20 (57)
and we also have that n = 1/I1(z0). These equations define the critical line. In particular it
is clear at this level that the dependence on the parameters of the risk premia distribution
enters trough the ratio /σ
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